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Introduction
A primary goal of the theory of product differentiation is the determination of market structure and conduct of firms that can choose the specifications of their products besides choosing output and price. Traditional models of product differentiation and marketing have focused on products that are defined by one characteristic only. 1 One-characteristic models are sufficient for the understanding of the interaction between product specification and price. The main question in this setting is the degree of product differentiation at equilibrium --does the acclaimed "Principle of Minimum Differentiation" (stating that product specifications will be very similar at equilibrium) hold? Intensive research on this question has conclusively determined that the Principle of Minimum Differentiation does not hold for any well-behaved model. 2 Thus, as long as we confine product differentiation to one dimension, there will be significant differences in the equilibrium product specifications. However, most goods are defined by a long vector of product attributes, and a priori, the failure of the Principle of Minimum Differentiation is not clear in multi-attribute competition.
The Principle of Minimum Differentiation fails in one-dimensional models because product similarity increases competition, and reduces prices and profits. In multi-attribute models, different possibilities emerge: products can be significantly differentiated along all dimensions (max-max-...-max differentiation) or products may have quite different degrees of product differentiation in different dimensions (for example, in three dimensions, maximum differentiation in one dimension and minimum differentiation on the rest, or max-min-min). The logic of the results of the one-dimensional model is not sufficient to show which of these configurations will be the equilibrium in multi-attribute settings.
The present paper determines the equilibrium configuration in a standard two-dimensional model as max-min. That is, we establish that firms will try to maximally differentiate in one dimension and minimally differentiate in another. We call this the Principle of MaximumMinimum Differentiation. We further show that when products can be differentiated in three
The qualitatively different degrees of product differentiation in different dimensions at the equilibrium of the two-and three-dimensional models, raises the possibility that wrong conclusions will be drawn from empirical observation that does not fully cover all dimensions.
For example, in three dimensions, if the maximal differentiation in one dimension remains unobserved, the equilibrium may seem to be one of uniformly minimal differentiation. However, if the only dimension observed is the one about which consumers care the most, then maximal differentiation will be observed. This raises serious concerns about the validity of empirical observation of degrees of product differentiation, since empirical observation is typically incomplete.
All our results are established in a framework of a two-stage game, in the first stage of which, firms simultaneously choose locations, while in the second stage they simultaneously choose prices. Thus, the equilibria we describe are subgame perfect, and firms anticipate the effects of changes in their locations to the equilibrium prices. Intuitively, this game structure captures the fact that prices are more flexible (easier to change) in the short run, while product specifications are not; pricing decisions often are made when product specifications cannot be changed.
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In the existing literature, few papers have allowed determination of product specifications in two characteristics, notably Economides (1993) , Neven and Thisse (1990) and Vandenbosch and Weinberg (1995) . 4 Neven and Thisse (1990) investigate product quality and variety decisions of two firms in a two dimensional product space. They combine the "horizontal" differentiation (ideal point) and "vertical" differentiation (vector attribute) paradigms, and investigate subgame-perfect equilibria for product and price decisions in a duopoly. Vandenbosch and Weinberg (1994) analyze a model of two-dimensional vertical (quality) differentiation.
After a working paper version of our article had been circulating, we discovered that Tabuchi (1994) had independently derived similar results for a model of two-dimensional variety differentiation. The main difference between Tabuchi's model and ours is that we use weights 4 on the disutilities of distance in each attribute and consumers' ideal points are distributed on a square; in contrast, Tabuchi has no weights but allowed for a rectangular shape of fixed area.
We show that there is a formal equivalence between the two models, i.e., a rectangle tall in the first dimension in Tabuchi is equivalent to a high preference weight of the first dimension in our model. Nevertheless, the intuitive interpretation of the results is quite different. Further, we provide results in the three-dimensional model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the market environment.
In Section 3, we analyze the two dimensional market and derive the price and position equilibria. We extend the model to three dimensions in Section 4. Finally in Section 5, we conclude with a discussion of our results and provide directions for future research.
The Model
We describe the model in general terms that are relevant for markets of either two or three attributes. We assume that there are two firms, labelled 1 and 2, and each offers a single n-attribute product. The position of a product i can be represented in n-dimensional attribute space by an n-tuple, θ i ∈ [0, 1] n . The elements of θ i give the position of the product on each of the n attributes. Each consumer is represented by an ideal point which gives the coordinates of the product which the consumer prefers the most if all products were sold at the same price.
A consumer j can therefore be represented by the vector of coordinates of his ideal point, A j
Each consumer's utility is a decreasing function of the square of the weighted Euclidean distance between the product specifications and the consumer's ideal point.
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Formally, a consumer of type A j derives the following utility from buying one unit of product i at price p i :
Y is a positive constant, the same for all consumers and assumed to be high enough so that all consumers buy a differentiated product. w is a vector of weights that the consumers attach to attributes. We assume that the w vector is same across all individuals.
Consumers' ideal points are distributed uniformly over the attribute space; consumers also possess perfect information about brand positions and prices in the market. Firms maximize profits and have zero marginal costs of production. 6 Firms compete by following a two-stage process. In the first stage, they simultaneously choose product positions. Once these are determined, they simultaneously choose prices in the second stage. We seek subgame-perfect equilibria of the game implied by this framework. Thus, firms anticipate the impact of location decisions on equilibrium prices. Given this basic model structure, we analyze next the twodimensional market in detail.
The Two Dimensional Model

Demand Formulation
In two dimensions, the joint space of consumers ideal points and products locations is a unit square. A product i is represented by the vector V i = (x i , y i ), whereas an arbitrary consumer can be identified by the address (a, b). Without loss of generality, we assume that y 2 ≥ y 1 and x 2 ≥ x 1 . A consumer's utility for product i takes the form
The demand for product i is generated by consumers who obtain greater utility from it than from the other product. The locus of consumers who are indifferent between brands 1 and 2 satisfies U 1 (a, b; x 1 , y 1 , p 1 ) = U 2 (a, b; x 2 , y 2 , p 2 ), which is equivalent to
where S = w 1 (x 2 2 -x 1 2 ) + w 2 (y 2 2 -y 1 2 ), X = x 2 -x 1 , and Y = y 2 -y 1 . This represents a straight line which partitions the total market (the unit square) into two demand areas for the firms.
Given our assumptions regarding the product positions, the area below the separating line represents firm 1's demand and the area above it represents firm 2's demand. The slope of the separating line (b-line) is independent of the prices, but the intercept is not. The location of the line within the unit square depends upon the price difference, p 1 -p 2 , between the two firms.
When firm 1 increases its price (or firm 2 decreases its price), the separating line shifts down reducing the market area for firm 1. Figure 1 shows the cases of scenario A that arise when ∂b/∂a < 1 ⇔ w 1 X < w 2 Y, i.e., the weighted difference in positions along attribute 2 is greater than the weighted difference in positions along attribute 1. Similarly, scenario B arises when w 2 Y < w 1 X. 
Scenario A
We first analyze scenario A and show how the demand expressions and profit functions depend upon the relative price difference between the firms. We fix the positions of both brands and the price of firm 2, p 2 . As price p 1 decreases, the b line that separates the market areas shifts upward. The three lines in Figure 1 represent It is easy to check that the demand expressions are continuous across the different price domains.
The different segments of D 2 can be derived in a manner analogous to that for D 1 .
Price Equilibrium
In this section, we show that a unique non-cooperative price equilibrium exists for any pair of product positions (chosen by the two firms in the first stage) in both two and three dimensions, and we calculate the equilibrium prices.
The main step in proving existence is in establishing that each firms' profit function is quasi-concave in its own price. The concavity properties of the profit function depend upon the choice of the utility function and the distribution of consumer preferences. Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) have established twin restrictions on utility functions and preference distributions that guarantee existence of price equilibria for a number of firms with n-dimensional product specifications. Our utility function (2) is a special case of the general utility function of Caplin and Nalebuff (Assumption A1, p. 29). In addition, the uniform distribution of consumer preferences is concave and confirms with the ρ-concavity conditions employed in Caplin and Nalebuff. Hence our model satisfies assumptions A1 and A2, of Caplin and Nalebuff. Then from their Theorems 1 and 2, a price equilibrium exists in our model, for any pair of positions.
Since the profit function is twice differentiable and the distribution of preferences is concave (and therefore log-concave), Caplin and Nalebuff's uniqueness result (Proposition 6, p. 42) 8 ensures that the price equilibrium is unique for each pair of product positions. What remains is to calculate the equilibrium prices for each pair of locations. This has to be done for each case in each scenario. The equilibrium price functions are obtained by solving the first order conditions of the profit functions ∂Π 1 /∂p 1 = ∂Π 2 /∂p 2 = 0 and checking the second order conditions for the positive price solution. 7 We describe these equilibria in the appendix of an unabridged working paper version of this article available from the authors upon request.
We now illustrate the relationship between our two dimensional model and Tabuchi's (1994) formulation. 8 Tabuchi models location-price equilibria in a rectangular product space, but assumes that both attributes are equally important for consumers. We assume that the two dimensional product space is a unit square, but associate different weights along the two dimensions. We find that the demand and profit expressions as well as the price equilibria are equivalent in these two formulations via a set of transformations on the product coordinates and attribute weights. Specifically, let (x 1 , y 1 , x 2 , y 2 ) and (w 1 , w 2 ) be the product coordinates and attribute weights, respectively, in our formulation, and let (X 1 , Y 1 , X 2 , Y 2 ) be the product coordinates in Tabuchi ). Thus, a less wide and more tall rectangle in Tabuchi is formally equivalent to our unit square with more weight given to the second (i.e., the vertical) characteristic. Since the demand and profit expressions are the same, so are the equilibrium prices for equivalent positions in the two models.
Product Equilibria
We now establish the subgame-perfect equilibrium positions of firms. With subgameperfection, firms anticipate the equilibrium prices in the subgames. We can write profits in the locations stage as Π i (x 1 , y 1 , x 2 , y 2 ) ≡ Π i (p 1 * (x 1 , y 1 , x 2 , y 2 ), p 2 * (x 1 , y 1 , x 2 , y 2 ), x 1 , y 1 , x 2 , y 2 ), i = 1, 2.
Thus, a change in location has two effects on profits: a direct effect, and an indirect effect through prices.
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Depending on the ratio of the weights w ≡ w 2 /w 1 , there are either one or two location equilibria (and their mirror images). At all equilibria, there is minimum differentiation in one dimension and maximum differentiation in the other. The first candidate equilibrium is (x 1 * , y 1 * ) = (1/2, 0), (x 2 * , y 2 * ) = (1/2, 1), i.e., firms are located in the middle of the horizontal segments of the box, implying minimum differentiation in x and maximum differentiation in y. We call this the min-max equilibrium. The second candidate equilibrium is (x 1 ** , y 1 ** ) = (0, 1/2), (x 2 ** , y 2 ** ) = (1, 1/2), i.e., firms are located at the middle points of the vertical segments of the box, implying minimum differentiation in y and maximum differentiation in x. We call this the maxmin equilibrium. At both equilibria, the firms share the market equally. At the first equilibrium, prices for both brands are p 1 = p 2 = w 2 and profits are Π 1 = Π 2 = w 2 /2; at the second equilibrium, prices are p 1 = p 2 = w 1 while profits are Π 1 = Π 2 = w 1 /2. Therefore, when the weights differ, and when both equilibria exist, both firms are better off at the equilibrium that corresponds to maximal differentiation in the product dimension for which the consumers care most. Firms are likely to coordinate to that equilibrium.
Positions implying maximal differentiation on both attributes (max-max) are not equilibrium positions, even though both firms have profits equal to the equilibrium profits when they are maximally differentiated on both attributes. Given that its opponent has located at the corner of the square, a firm has a unilateral incentive to deviate from the diametrically opposite corner and move inwards thereby increasing its market share. Such an inward move in one attribute is based on incentives that are analogous to those in the one-dimensional Hotelling (1929) model with linear transportation costs. In that model, profits are equal for any symmetric locations, but each firm had a unilateral incentive to move toward the other firm. The two opposing forces, one driving firms apart due to price competition, and the other bringing them together, due to market share dynamics, are resolved in favor of market share forces. In contrast, in the one-dimensional model with quadratic costs, where again the opposing forces operate on a single attribute, the resolution is in favor of price competition, and the equilibrium is at maximal differentiation. When there are two or more dimensions, the two opposing forces resolve along different dimensions. Due to the dominance of price competition, we see maximal differentiation along the most important attribute, whereas the market share effect encourages firms to occupy central positions on the less important attribute.
An example of a product category that exhibits max-min differentiation is ice cream.
Consider a single flavor, say chocolate. Most of the important differences among brands are dictated by their fat and sugar contents. These characteristics govern both flavor and how healthy (or perhaps more accurately unhealthy) each brand is. A trip to the grocery store with a casual inspection of the nutrition labels will reveal that the amount of fat per 100 gram serving (approximately 1/2 to 3/4 cup, depending on the ice cream's density) varies from none for the 11 fat-free brands to about 22 grams for the super premium brands (e.g. Haagen Daas). Yet all brands tend to have in the neighborhood of 25 grams of carbohydrates or sugar.
It is natural to ask whether this pattern of equilibria generalizes to higher dimensions.
In higher dimensions, will competitors differentiate on more than one attribute or continue to differentiate only on one attribute? Will we continue to get just two equilibria or will the number of equilibria depend on the dimensionality of the product space? To answer these questions, we analyze a three-dimensional market in the next section.
The Three Dimensional Model
Demand Formulation
In three dimensions, the joint space of consumers and product locations is a unit cube.
A product i is represented by the vector θ i = (x i , y i , z i ) whereas an ideal point for consumer j is denoted by A j = (a, b, c). We continue to assume that x 2 ≥ x 1 , y 2 ≥ y 1 , z 2 ≥ z 1 , and that the attribute weights w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , are constant across consumers. Thus, the utility of consumer A j when he buys one unit of product θ i is As the demand expressions for the two firms depend upon the position and orientation of the separating plane, the demand expressions change whenever the indifference plane shifts its location and passes through a corner of the unit cube. To capture the dependence of the demand expressions on the relationship between prices and firm locations, we first distinguish between twelve scenarios that are characterized by the locations of the firms.
We first document all twelve scenarios. The defining features of these scenarios are: We now focus on the dependence of the demand expressions and profit functions on the relative price difference between the firms. Within each scenario (configuration of attribute weights and product positions), we identify seven cases that are distinguished by the difference in the prices p 2 -p 1 . We now present the demand expressions originating in Scenario 1A, and discuss the other scenarios in the Appendix to this paper. Case 1A: when 0 ≤ L ≤ 2w 1 X, demand for firm 1 is
where H = 48w 1 w 2 w 3 XYZ.
When p 1 is further decreased, the separating plane passes through the corner (1, 0, 0) of the product space and as shown in case 2, Figure 3 , and we have:
When p 1 is further reduced, the plane while moving up crosses the corner (0, 1, 0) and we have: When p 1 is further reduced so that the separating plane moves past the (0, 0, 1) corner, we have:
Case 5A: when 2w 3 Z ≤ L ≤ 2(w 1 X+w 3 Z), 
Next, on further reduction in p 1 , the plane passes past (1, 0, 1) and we get:
Case 6A: when p 1 satisfies 2(w 1 X + w 3 Z) ≤ L ≤ 2(w 2 Y + w 3 Z), we have 
This reduces to 
Price Equilibrium
Following the arguments based on Caplin and Nalebuff given for the two dimensional model in section 3.2, it is apparent that a unique price equilibrium exists for each set of product positions in three dimensions. We therefore begin by describing the equilibrium price expressions within each case of scenario 1A. The above equilibrium prices apply to product positions which satisfy 0 ≤ p 2 1A* -p 1 1A* + S < 2w 1 X. Positions that result in case 1A also satisfy w 1 X ≤ w 2 Y ≤ (w 1 X + w 2 Y) ≤ w 3 Z.
We define the pairs of locations that satisfy these conditions (and therefore result in case 1A) We were unable to obtain closed form solutions to this set of equations. The equilibrium prices for this case apply to product locations which satisfy 2w 2 Y ≤ (p 2 3A* -p 1 3A* + S) < 2(w 1 X + w 2 Y). The LHS for the above inequality is satisfied when (G2) fails and the RHS is satisfied when 4w 1 X + 4w 2 Y -2w 3 Z > S.
These conditions along with w 1 X ≤ w 2 Y ≤ (w 1 X + w 2 Y) ≤w 3 Z, define the region R 3A of product coordinates for which the above equations yield equilibrium prices We were unable to obtain closed form solutions for this set of equations. The equilibrium prices for this case apply to product locations which satisfy 2w 3 Z ≤ (p 2 5A* -p 1 5A* + S) < 2(w 1 X + w 3 Z).
The LHS for the above inequality is satisfied when (G4) fails and the RHS is satisfied when 3S -E > 15w 1 X + 16w 3 Z -18w 2 Y.
These conditions, together with w 1 X ≤ w 2 Y ≤ (w 1 X + w 2 Y) ≤w 3 Z, define the region R 5A of product coordinates for which the above equations yield equilibrium prices.
Case 6A: The first order conditions yield two solutions. After eliminating the one with negative prices we have the following equilibrium prices: 
Product Equilibrium
We now establish the subgame perfect equilibrium positions of firms. With subgameperfection, firms anticipate the equilibrium prices in the subgames. We can write profits in the location stage as
Thus a change in location has two effects on profits: a direct effect, and an indirect effect through prices.
As in two dimensions, we find that maximal differentiation on all attributes, i.e., maxmax-max is not an equilibrium for any set of attribute weights. The proof is presented in an appendix to an unabridged working paper version of this article available from the authors upon request. In particular, we find that, at the equilibrium locations, the two firms are maximally differentiated on only one attribute and are minimally differentiated on the rest. That is, the subgame-perfect location-price equilibria are always of the type max-min-min or min-max-min 1/2, 1/2), (x 2 *** , y 2 *** , z 2 *** ) = (1, 1/2, 1/2). We name this the max-min-min equilibrium. We can show that
1)
The min-min-max equilibrium given by θ 1 * = (1/2, 1/2, 0), θ 2 * = (1/2, 1/2, 1), holds when the weights satisfy w 3 /w 1 ≥ 0.406 and w 3 /w 2 ≥ 0.406.
2)
The min-max-min equilibrium, given by the positions θ 1 ** = (1/2, 0, 1/2), θ 2 ** = (1/2, 1, 1/2), holds when w 2 /w 1 ≥ 0.406 and w 2 /w 3 ≥ 0.406.
3)
The max-min-min equilibrium, given by the locations θ 1 *** = (0, 1/2, 1/2), θ 2 *** = (1, 1/2, 1/2), holds when w 1 /w 2 ≥ 0.406 and w 1 /w 3 ≥ 0.406.
The method of proof is summarized as follows. Suppose that firm 2 is located at (x 2 * , y 2 * , z 2 * ) = (1/2, 1/2, 1). We identify the direction in which profits of firm 1 increase as its location changes by calculating the (vector) gradient of profits DΠ 1 . We do this by evaluating analytic expressions for DΠ 1 . We identify locations for firm 1 that represent a local maximum, minimum, or saddle point of its profit function. Let w 1 < w 2 . We find that, when w 3 is large such that w 3 /w 2 ≥ 1 and w 3 /w 1 ≥ 1, there is only one local maximum of Π 1 , at θ 1 = (1/2, 1/2, 0); therefore it is also a global maximum (in x 1 , y 1 and z 1 ) of the profit function Π 1 . It follows that for w 3 /w 2 ≥ 1 and w 3 /w 1 ≥ 1, location (1/2, 1/2, 0) is the best response to
(1/2,1/2,1). For the same range of weight ratios, by symmetry with respect to the horizontal plane passing through (1/2,1/2,1/2), θ 2 * = (1/2, 1/2, 1) is the global best response to (1/2, 1/2, 0). Thus, for this range of weight ratios, min-min-max is an equilibrium.
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Given that firm 2 is located at θ 2 * = (1/2, 1/2, 1), when w 3 is smaller so that the weights satisfy w 3 /w 1 > 1 and 0.406 < w 3 /w 2 < 1, there are two local maxima of firm 1's profits, at θ 1 * = (1/2, 1/2, 0) and θ 1 ** = (1/2, 0, 1/2). Let the "middle location" profits of firm 1 be Π 1 (M) ≡ Π 1 (1/2, 1/2, 0) and let the "left" profits be Π 1 (L) ≡ Π 1 (1/2, 0, 1/2). For the above range of weight ratios, to the "left" and "middle" locations described above. In contrast to the previous case, in this situation, Π 1 (M) < Π 1 (L); therefore, θ 1 ** = (1/2, 0, 1/2) is the best reply to (1/2, 1/2, 1).
However, θ 2 * = (1/2, 1/2, 1) is not the best reply to (1/2, 0, 1/2). This is established as follows.
Let firm 1 be at (1/2, 0, 1/2). The problem of the choice of location by firm 2 is symmetric to the analogous problem of firm 1. From the view point of firm 2, the relative weights are w 2 /w 1 > 1 and w 2 /w 3 > 2.463 > 1. It follows from previous arguments (made for firm 1) that (1/2, 1, 1/2) is a global best reply to (1/2, 0, 1/2). Therefore (1/2, 1/2, 1) is not the best reply to
(1/2, 0, 1/2) and min-min-max is not an equilibrium while min-max-min is an equilibrium when inequalities A hold.
Consider next the relationships in B: 0.406 < w 3 /w 2 < 1 and 0.406 < w 3 /w 1 < 1. When inequalities B are satisfied, there are three local maxima for firm 1's profit function. These correspond to the "middle", and "left" locations defined above and a "right" location given by θ 1 *** = (0, 1/2, 1/2). Here the best response is the "middle" location (1/2, 1/2, 0). Hence, min-min-max is an equilibrium when the weights satisfy conditions B.
When w 3 is lowered so that the weights satisfy 0 < w 3 /w 2 ≤ 0.406 and 0.406 < w 3 /w 1 < 1, there are three local maxima for firm 1's profit function. The global maximum is at the "left" location, i.e, (1/2, 0, 1/2). Once, firm 1 is at the "left" location, then as shown above, (1/2, 1/2, 1) is no longer the global maximum for firm 2. Firm 2 has an incentive to be at (1/2, 1, 1/2) and min-min-max is no longer a subgame perfect equilibrium. Finally, when 0 < w 3 /w 2 ≤ 0.406 and 0 < w 3 /w 1 ≤ 0.406, as above, there are three local maxima, but the "left" location for firm 1 is the global maximum, leading to the min-max-min locational equilibrium.
The above argument characterized conditions when min-min-max is an equilibrium. Notice that in the entire discussion above, we assumed w 1 < w 2 . Hence, under all conditions, the global maxima for firm 1's profits were either at the "left" or the "middle" location. When w 2 ≤ w 1 , we can show that the global maxima would be either at the "right" or the "middle" location.
Finally, by repeating the entire argument described above, but focussing instead on the weight ratios w 2 /w 1 and w 2 /w 3 , we can characterize the conditions under which min-max-min is an equilibrium. By focussing on w 1 /w 2 and w 1 /w 3 instead, we can characterize the conditions on the weights for which max-min-min is an equilibrium.
Putting all these together, the regions of existence of these equilibria can easily be illustrated on the three dimensional simplex in Figure 4 , where w 1 + w 2 + w 3 = 1, w 1 , w 2 , w 3 ≥ 0. On segment AC define the points D and D′ such that (AD)/(DC) = (CD′)/(AD′) = 0.406, with similar definitions of E, E′, F, and F′ on segments AB and BC. The region of the weights w = (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 ) ∈ (CDHF′) that leads to a min-min-max equilibrium is shaded. Similarly, w ∈ (AE′KD′) leads to a max-min-min equilibrium, and w ∈ (BFME) leads to a min-max-min equilibrium. Notice that, roughly speaking, each equilibrium has maximal differentiation in the dimension that corresponds to the highest weight. Further, when the weights are roughly similar and fall in the central hexagon (MGHIKL), all three equilibria exist. In regions where two weights are high but the third weight is low, two equilibria exist, each with maximal differentiation in the dimension that corresponds one of the two high weights. For example, for w ∈ (DGMLD′), min-min-max and max-min-min are both equilibria. In regions where only one weight is large (close to the vertices) only one equilibrium exists --the one that differentiates maximally in the dimension the large weight. For example, for w ∈ (CD′LF) only the maxmin-min equilibrium exists.
At each of equilibrium, both firms charge equal prices and share the market equally. This pattern of equilibrium positions confirms our understanding that in multidimensional spaces, firms seek to differentiate their offerings on one dimension only in order to reduce the impact of price competition. Once products are differentiated maximally in one dimension, firms assume identical (central) positions on the other attributes. 
Conclusion
In this paper we have examined product positioning and pricing in a multi-attribute framework. We derived subgame-perfect equilibrium positions and associated prices for a duopoly. In one dimension, maximal differentiation holds as shown in D' Aspremont et al. (1979) . We find that, in two dimensions, there are two equilibria when all consumers consider the two attributes as equally important. In each of these equilibria, firms are maximally differentiated on one attribute and minimally differentiated on other. Moreover, when firms are minimally differentiated on one attribute, they occupy central positions on that attribute. We also find that when attributes are differentially weighted by the consumers, so that one attribute has significantly greater importance than the other, only a single equilibrium remains. In this equilibrium firms maximally differentiate on the more important attribute and occupy central positions on the other attribute.
In moving from two to three dimensions we showed that the essential character of the equilibrium does not change. In particular, at the three-dimensional equilibrium, firms are maximally differentiated on one dimension only. In three dimensions, depending on the importance that consumers place in each attribute, there is one, two, or three equilibria. In each equilibrium, firms are maximally differentiated on one attribute and minimally differentiated on the other two. An equilibrium with maximal differentiation in a certain dimension occurs when consumers place sufficient importance to the corresponding attribute. Thus, if consumers place importance only to the first attribute, the equilibrium is max-min-min, i.e., it has maximal differentiation in the first dimension only. When consumers place importance on the second attribute as well, the min-max-min equilibrium occurs too. Further, when consumers place importance on the third attribute as well, the min-min-max equilibrium occurs in addition to the other two. Thus, for example, when all attributes are weighted equally, all three equilibria (maxmin-min, min-max-min, and min-min-max) exist.
That the character of the equilibrium is stable is not surprising. Both the two-and threedimensional cases use the preference function defined in expression (1) in section 2. In fact, the two-dimensional case can be viewed as a special case of the three-dimensional one where w 3 = 0. If only the most important of three attributes is differentiated, then knowledge of the threedimensional solution implies the two-dimensional and the one-dimensional ones. Reasoning in the reverse direction, if a product is only differentiated in the most important attribute, then we would expect not only the third, but any additional attributes to be minimally differentiated.
Unfortunately, we have not yet been able to prove that conjecture.
Up to this point we have used the unit square in two dimensions (and the unit cube in three) as both the space of location of consumers' ideal points and the space of product offerings.
Keeping the consumers space and preference distribution the same, we now allow the space of product offerings to be significantly larger, so that each attribute can range from 1/2 -k to 1/2 + k, with k arbitrarily large. The character of equilibrium remains unchanged, with maximal differentiation in only one dimension. In that dimension, products occupy positions outside the consumers' space. The equilibrium locations in two dimensions are (-1/4, 1/2) for firm 1 and (5/4, 1/2) for firm 2. In three dimensions, for example, the max-min-min equilibrium is at (-1/4, 1/2, 1/2) and (5/4, 1/2, 1/2).
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An important aspect of our results is the multiplicity of equilibria in both the two and the three-dimensional models. When consumers value all attributes roughly equally, all locational n-tuples with maximal differentiation in one dimension and minimal differentiation in all others, are equilibria. As more weight is put on a particular dimension, equilibria get eliminated one by one until we reach a unique equilibrium. This shows that advertising can have a very important role in eliminating certain equilibria. If advertising can get consumers to pay more attention to a certain product attribute, and perhaps weigh it more heavily in preference formation, it can determine which of several equilibria will hold. Therefore, a firm with a unique ability to produce a product consistent with one of the equilibrium positions will certainly want to advertize in an attempt to direct the market to that equilibrium. It is noteworthy that this depends only on the relative importances of the different attributes and not on the relative preferences of individual consumers for different levels of any specific attribute.
There are a number of directions in which these results can be extended. 12 First, there is the obvious extension to higher dimensional spaces. Are the equilibrium locations of a ndimensional attribute spaces only differentiated in one dimension? 
Appendix: Demand Definitions for the Three-Dimensional Model
We describe the demand expressions and regions pertaining to Scenario 1B, first and then describe the relationships among the remaining scenarios. As is evident from the above, the two scenarios differ across only one demand expression.
However, the regions of the product space associated with cases 3, 4, and 5, are different across the two scenarios.
We now show how the remaining scenarios can be obtained from the two that were analyzed above. We define transformation rules that we use on the above derived demand expressions and price inequalities so as to obtain the corresponding expressions in the other These rules work as follows. In order to obtain the seven cases of demand and the associated price domains for Scenario 2A, we apply rep2 on the corresponding demand expressions and price domains of Scenario 1A. For example, the demand expression for case 1 of Scenario 2A can be obtained by simultaneously substituting in D 1 1A above, w 1 X in place of w 1 X, w 3 Z in place of w 2 Y, and w 2 Y in place of w 3 Z. These replacement rules follow from the geometric symmetry associated with the sides of the unit cube. Similarly, Scenario 2B can be analyzed by applying rep2 on the corresponding expressions of Scenario 1B. The other scenarios can be analyzed in an analogous manner. 
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